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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
All religious organization, as any other firm, have their objectives,  
among which are ways to attract new converts.  To attain their aims, 
each religious organization is endowed with a diversity of options among 
several organizational strategies.  To be successful  in achieving these 
objectives will  be conditioned, in great measure,  to the skills and 
performance of those who are responsible for the leadership of the 
organization, regarding the commitment of these persons with what has 
been planned.  It is of the utmost importance for the religious firm that  
its clerics, in their several hierarchical levels, superiors and 
subordinates, exercise a level of effort  suitable with the results expected 
from each one of them.  
The contracts establ ished between religious organizations and its  
clerics (workers) may be inserted in the approach of the principal -agent 
problem. Within this context, the firm would be the principal and its  
clerics, the agents.  Therefore, according to Zech (2001, p.328) th is 
relationship principal -agent would not be immune to problems such as 
moral hazard  –  in the case of shirking  behavior on the part of the 
workers –  adverse selection –  with hidden information  –  and 
dislodgement of objectives –  where the workers might exer t an effort , 
but in activities which are not those having priority for the firm.  
 The clerics, in the lack of appropriate incentives, would rather 
reduce their efforts to a minimum, acting in their own benefit.  These 
problems tend to become worse when the monitoring costs are high.  
Evidently, the more detailed and complete the contract between the agent 
and the principal, the nearer they will be to the optimum relativity of the 
equationing of the interest of both parties involved in the contractual 
relationship,  this means, a “first-best”  contract.   However,  this contract 
would be conditioned to the nonexistence of hidden information ,  to 
measurability and to the observability of the agent’s behavior, the 
absence of risk or of reduced risk,  as well as the possibility of the 
principal imposing severe penalties on the agent, in the case of the agent 
not complying with the contract.  When this is not possible, the 
alternative is  to create a “second-best” contract.  
After this introduction, we discuss, in next section,  the model of 
Câmara (2002) modified to religious organizations , through the inclusion 
of non-monetary income or psychic income,  with two clerics  skills and a 
homogeneous phase.  The objective of this procedure is the modification, 
for the purpose of this work, that considers a Tournament between two 
clerics, who possess homogeneous skills  and abilities, to be applied to 
the case of a religious organization, especially,  the Roman C atholic 
Church and religious firms with similar hierarchical structures.   
 
 
2. Tournaments In Religious Organizations  With Investment In 
Religious Human Capital .  
 
In this section, we will present a version, modified,  of Câmara´s 
Tournaments  model (2002), which includes the possibil ity of the 
participants in the promotion tournament to invest in human capital.  
However, here we will consider an adaptation of the model for the 
purpose of this work, specifically for religious organizations.   In stead of 
the wider concept of human capital, considered by Câmara in his work, 
the concept of religious human capital will be considered.  The main 
modification is the inclusion of psychic income or non -monetary income 
in the model.   
The model has one stage and two competing clerics,    and  ,  who 
present a differentiated production function given by    (   ),  where µ 
represents the effort ,   is  the religious capital of the cleric,  (   )    and 
    ⁄         ⁄           ⁄   ,        ⁄   .  The cost function is given by 
 (   )    ( )    ( ) in which   ( )     ( )=0,      ( )        ( )  
       ( )         ( )   .  The clerics have identical  functions,  both in 
terms of production and cost, presenting in this way, homogeneous 
abili ties.  Besides,  they present neutrality to risk.   
The religious organization will  observe the production   of each 
cleric participating in the tournament ,  which will be a function of 
 (   ),  multiplied by a random error    common to both clerics 
participating in the tournament .   Here, we consider the common error 
and not individual and independent errors, since the heavier the weight 
of the common error the higher the efficiency of the tournament .   In this 
way, clerics    and  ,  will present the following individual productions:   
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The probabili ty  (   ) of cleric    overcoming cleric     will be 
given by:  
 
 
                                (   )  
 (    )
 (    )  (    )
                                       (2) 
                 
 
Where the random factor  ,  that is common to both clerics and has  
the propriety of being multipliable, is annulled, and does not affect the 
probability of the two clerics to win the dispute.  
For the problem of maximization of each one of the clerics, an 
alteration of Câmara’s (2002) model will  be made, which is the inclusion 
of  non-monetary differential between clerics. This non-monetary income 
is also known as psychic income according to Thurow (1978) and Zech 
(2001, p.331; 2007, p.738), originating in status, privileges,  use of tit les 
and  insignias, satisfaction in pleasing and serving God and fellow men, 
testimony of eternal salvation through a faithfully professed priesthood, 
etc
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 Therefore, we have that:  
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Here,    and    represent, respectively,  the monetary and non -
monetary income of the cleric who obtains the first place in the 
Tournament (that  of Bishop or Supervisor);    and    represent the same 
thing for the cleric classified in second place (assistant) .  With that,  the 
remuneration of the Supervisor or Bishop will be           and the 
remuneration of the assistant will  be         .  Besides, as in the 
previous case, having               and consequently      ,  for 
the marginal effort to be positive.  Substi tuting (2) into (3) we have that:  
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 The first order conditions will  be given by:  
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Rewriting equations (5) and (6), the result is:  
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In this manner, the first order conditions (F.O.C) will be respected 
when:   
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The conditions of the second order require that the one derived 
from the clerics maximization function  ,  given by equation (4),  be a 
negative semi defined Hessian matrix.   
In this way, we have that:  
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 The same reasoning is applied for cleric  .  Rewriting equation (9) 
we have that:   
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The equation above indicates that , in a situation of balance, the 
marginal substi tution rate (MSR) between     and   ,  this is to say,  
between the effort  of cleric   and his religious capital, must be equal to 
his marginal substi tution cost (MSC).  It also informs that those 
variables depend upon the spread between prizes, whether monetary or 
non-monetary.     
Equation (11) indicates that the values related to effort  an d 
religious human capital chosen by cleric  ,  given respectively by     and 
  ,  will  depend on the spread between monetary income and non -
monetary income (psychic income), given, respectively,  by     and    .   
Here,  differently from the Câmara (2002) model,  where     should be 
positive, due to the inclusion of the non -monetary income,     may 
assume a null value, but only if     is  positive for the clerics who 
participate in the tournament to have incentives to do their  best and 
invest in religious human capital. This is:           .   
Besides, it  can be observed in (9) and (11) that a lower spread in 
monetary income can be compensated by higher spread in non -monetary 
income and vice-versa.   Even if      ,  this is, spread in monetary 
income is null, when the candidates receive equal monetary income, or if  
          this is, even if the candidates do not receive any monetary 
income, the spread in psychic income might be sufficient as a stimulus 
for the effort of the clerics participating in the promotion tournament.   
Such is the case of catholic clerics who belong to Institutes of 
Consecrated Life (Code of Canon Law), of the Roman Catholic Church, 
who must take a vow of poverty (together with those of obed ience and 
chastity) and do not receive a monetary salary.   This is not a reason, for 
a novice who enters an order or a Catholic Institute of Consecrated Life,  
for example, not to seek becoming a high -ranking abbot within this 
organization, for example.   
In other words, when dealing with promotion tournaments applied 
to clerics, the spread in monetary income might be of little importance or 
even, not make any difference at all in stimulating the clerics to the 
effort.  This is because, according to the exig encies made to those who 
wish to dedicate themselves totally to a religious life,  the most 
significant factor, in order to extract the maximum performance from the 
participants of the tournament, might be the expansion in spread of the 
psychic income and not an increase in monetary remuneration, as i t 
happens in secular organizations.    
In these, the stimulus to increase the effort of the workers may 
come not only from the spread of the monetary income but also from 
non-monetary income, in forms such as prestige, influence, hierarchical  
power and status  of the job, placed as prizes for the promotion 
tournament, for example.  This indicates that, both in the case of 
religious organizations, the tournament model would need to be only 
minimally adapted, in order  to include the psychic income as well, as i t  
is being done here and, in this way, becoming closer to si tuations as the 
one being dealt with in this paper.   Besides, it  is necessary to take into 
account that,  in situations where the cleric does not receive  a monetary 
income, the importance of include the psychic income is  crucial, in order 
to satisfy (9) and (11).  Otherwise,  the marginal cost  exercise incurred in 
by the cleric would be equal to zero, in which case a promotion 
tournament would be nonexisten t.   
Still  observing equation (9) and (11),  it  can be perceived that an 
increase either in    and/or in   ,  increases the ratio on the right hand 
side of the equation. With the objective of maintaining the equality, the 
ratio between the marginal cost and the marginal product of     and   ,  on 
the left hand side, should also increase correspondingly.  This means that 
an increase in    and/or in     gives rise to an increase of the effort  
    and of the investment in religious capital    of cleric  .   Identical  
reasoning is applied to cleric  .  
In equations (9) and (11) the effects of the variations of the 
production function of cleric   are not constant, since  ( ) is  present 
both in the numerator as in the denominator of t he equations.  Therefore, 
increases in  ( )  when its value is sufficiently small, will imply in 
corresponding increases in  ( ),  until  there is  a balance in  ( ).   Beyond 
that  point,  increases in  ( ) will  imply corresponding decreases in  ( ).  
This means that  cleric   will respond to the increase of effort and of 
religious capital investment of cleric    equivalently,  with the objective of 
winning the tournament, according to the description in equation (9) 
until there is a balance.  Beyond that point, it  will not compensate, in 
terms of benefit,  for cleric   to increase    and    ,  where the cost 
 (   ) will be so high that the cleric prefers not to continue disputing 
the tournament.   
Equation (11) informs the entire range of optimum choices in 
terms of    and   ,  in order to satisfy the F.O.C. so to maximize the 
individual utility of the cleric.  In this way, with the aim of obtaining the 
best response function, each optimal bundle must be substituted, in (4),  
by a feasible equivalent variable   (     )       .   With this, the 
function to be maximized would be the following:   
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The F.O.C. conditions will be given by:  
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The second order conditions will  be given by:  
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The reaction function of cleric    will  be given by:  
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The reaction function of cleric   will  be symmetrical .  Both 
reactions functions are represented in the following figure:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I, as well as the reaction function in (15), indicates that , 
considering the existence of a Nash balance in pure strategies,  it  will  
result  in   
  
    
 ,  which derives in   
    
   and    
    
     This is,  in the 
balance, both clerics will present the same level of effort and investment 
of religious human capital, where the probabilities of each one of them 
winning the tournament will  be equal to  (   )       
 
Final  considerat ions 
Remuneration per product is not a rule among organizations to 
stimulate the effort  of their workers, and this is particularly true for 
religious organizations, considering the intrinsic difficulty in measuring 
and monitoring the performance  of their clerics (Zech, 2001, p.331).  
Therefore, in this work, we consider promotions as an incentive 
remuneration mechanism, that is  to say, the Tournaments  Promotion 
Model, as an explanatory and plausible theoretical framework for the 
remuneration rules of the workers in religious organizations.   
Tournaments are commonly used by religious organizations, even if they 
are not aware of it ,  in order to st imulate their workers, who act in the 
scenario of an organizational internal market, where asymmetrical  
information and relatively high monitoring costs are highlighted, and 
where promotions are the main form of incentive.  
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